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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND JOINT CUSTODY: NEW YORK
IS NOT MEASURING UP
BY TONIA ETTINGER
INTRODUCTION

Only by observing the family court system first hand can
the inadequacies be truly understood. As a law school student I
was given the invaluable opportunity to spend a substantial amount
of time in Erie County Family Court helping victims of domestic
violence obtain orders of protection.' These proceedings were
naturally intertwined with bitter custody disputes. I saw time and
again the push toward joint custody arrangements between the
victim and the batterer.2 This was accomplished systematically,
both directly and indirectly.
Most of the women who came to Family Court were
naturally terrified, not only because they were unfamiliar with the
process, but also they were well aware of the dangers that could
come about if their abusers learned of such proceedings. Some of
the women filed for sole custody of their children simultaneously
with a petition for an order of protection. Unknowingly, they
believed that all final decisions would be made at this initial exparte proceeding. Myself or another domestic violence advocate
would explain the general process to the victims we saw, but
because of inherent flaws in the system or an overabundant amount
of clients, not every victim was afforded that benefit.
Regardless of what transpired at the initial temporary
protective order court proceeding, by the end of the day, the
victims were well aware that their abusers were going to be served
with the papers that were just filed. Often times, service would
'For my second year of law school I volunteered at Erie County Family Court
through the Domestic Violence Task Force; sponsored by Haven House. The
following summer I worked 30 hours a week for ten weeks at the same position.
The Fall 2002 semester I completed my clinic placement there as well.
2 Domestic violence has both male and female victims, but this paper will utilize
female pronouns for the victim because more than 90% of victims of domestic
violence are in fact female.
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create increased conflict and safety concerns for the victim. I
heard from countless clients at their second court appearance that
the abuser was threatening to take the children away and that she
would never be granted custody. In fact, many times the abuser
would cross petition for sole custody of the children to increase the
strength of his threat and further intimidate and control the victim.
Frequently the women would be given a referral to
assigned counsel at their initial court proceeding. With or without
an attorney, the Judge would push the parties to come to some
agreement. While the option of having a hearing or trial was
always given to the client, they were strongly encouraged to settle,
for what I saw as mainly administrative reasons on the part of the
court. Unfortunately, many times the women were not told that the
Judge could only order joint custody by an expressed agreement of
the parties.
Other reasons some victims opted for joint custody was the
fear that if they did not agree to joint custody, the court might
award sole custody to the abuser. This was a belief heavily
perpetuated by the abuser himself. Seemingly, having joint
custody is better than no custody at all. Another reason for
agreeing to joint custody was to put an end to the numerous court
proceedings. Victims would come back to court over and over
again only to be given another return date. Finally, custody was
frequently used as leverage by the abuser as well. The abuser
would agree to withdraw his petition for sole custody, and agree to
joint custody, if the victim agreed to dismiss the order of
protection. Yet, she was still seldom informed by the court or her
attorney that joint custody could not be awarded unless the parties
expressly agreed.
My observations at Erie County Family Court prompted
this paper, proposing that joint custody should never be granted in
cases involving domestic violence and that New York should adopt
a presumption against such an award. Part II will examine the
custody laws in New York, including the 1996 amendments and
"joint" custody. Part III focuses on the dangers of joint custody in
cases of domestic violence. Part IV explores the presumption
adopted by the Louisiana legislature as a model New York should
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adopt. Part V will critique the inadequacies of the current New
York statute and recommend that a presumption be adopted.
NEW YORK STATE CUSTODY LAWS

In 1962, Domestic Relations Law (DRL) Section 240 was
enacted, which states in part that "the court shall.. .enter orders for
custody and support as ....
justice requires, having regard to the
circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and to the
best interests of the child.",3 The courts have repeatedly upheld this
best interest of the child standard over the years. In fact, the Court
of Appeals, in Eschbach v. Eschbach4 and Friederwitzer v.
Friederwitzer5 clearly acknowledged that the best interest6 of the
child is to be the standard governing child custody disputes.
3 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (Consol. 2003).

4 56 N.Y.2d 167 (1982).

' 55 N.Y.2d 89 (1982).
6 The laws regarding child custody have transformed significantly over
the last
century. For thousands of years women and children were viewed as property of
the husband/father and as such the men were entitled to complete control and
custody, D. Lee Khachaturian, Domestic Violence and Shared Parental
Responsibility: Dangerous Bedfellows, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 1745, 1749-1750
(1999); see also Linda R. Keenan, Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation:
The Need For Statutory Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 407, 410-411 (1985);
Physically beating the wife or the child was a perfectly acceptable phenomenon
in order for the man to exercise his authority and keep his "property" in place,
Hon. Elliott Wilk, Domestic Violence and Child Custody, 296 PLI/EST 291, 294
(2000); In fact, up until 1977 wife battering was not a criminal offense in New
York State, Keenan, supra, at 441 n.6; With such perceptions of the status of
women and children at the time, it is little surprise that upon divorce women had
no right to child custody, Khachaturian, supra, at 1749; Slowly, women became
to be seen as more than merely economic non-entities and by the end of the
nineteenth century the tender years doctrine emerged. This doctrine created a
presumption that mothers were better able to care for young children, by nature,
and was therefore favored in child custody disputes, Keenan, supra, at 412;
Again, as society changed, the notion that mothers were naturally the better
parent declined. In response, some states began to use the primary care taker
doctrine when making child custody decisions. This presumption awarded
custody to the parent who had been responsible for the day-to-day care of the
child, and while the doctrine was gender neutral there was still a preference for
mothers, Khachaturian, supra, at 1750; This preference for mothers continued
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Defining the concept of "best interest" is a much more
elusive concept, but through case law over the years a number of
factors have been laid out for the court to consider. Factors
considered by the court, pre 1996, include the stability of the living
arrangement, the child's wishes, the relative fitness of the parents,
the quality of the home environment, the location of siblings and
the ability of each parent to provide for the emotional and
intellectual development of the child.7 Notably however, "judges
frequently define best interests in accordance with beliefs as to
which they perceive general cultural agreement, which, in many
cases, comports with their own subjective ideas of what is good for
children." 8 No factor is more dispositive than another and it is
completely within the judge's discretion as to how much weight
each individual factor is given.
New York was one state, among many, to adopt the best
interest of the child approach, but many other state legislatures
went a step further to put the parents on equal footing by including
a joint custody provision in their custody statutes. 9 Many fathers'
rights groups saw this as a further step in avoiding the maternal
preference in custody disputes.' 0 In fact, by 1995 over 40 states
had provision or presumptions dealing with joint custody." While
there is not a universal definition for joint custody, it is typically
understood to mean shared rights and responsibilities. Normally,
the custodial parent makes day-to-day decisions, while both

mainly because they were the parent at home responsible for the child, while the
man was employed outside of the home.
7 E.g., Ostrander v. Ostrander,541 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1989); see also Eschbach, 56
N.Y.2d at 172-174.
8 Wilk, supra note 6, at 293. (Note again that a judge wrote this particular

article).
9Khachaturian, supra note 6, at 1751. (This is not to say that the courts were not
awarding joint custody prior to this, it was simple not embodied in most statutes
early on).
10Barbara Handschu & Mark Kay Kisthardt, Joint-Custody Pointers, 7/17/00
NLJ A14 (Col. 1); see also Khachaturian, supra note 6, at 1751.
1 Handschu & Kisthardt, supra note 10.
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parents share decisions concerning major issues such as religion,
education, and medical care.12
Although New York courts have a wide scope in choosing
what is in the best interests of the child under DRL § 240, efforts
to include a preference in favor of joint custody have repeatedly
failed. 13 In 1978, the New York Court of Appeals in Brainman v.
Brainman interpreted DRL § 240 as it relates to joint custody by
stating "joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary
alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in a
mature civilized fashion. As a court-ordered arrangement imposed
upon already embattled and embittered [parents]... it can only

enhance familial chaos." 14 This premise still has vitality, some 24
years later, and it is important to note that nowhere in the New
York State statute is joint custody mentioned.
In 1979, only a year after the Brainman decision but
notably before Eschbach and Friederwitzer, the New York State
Governor created a task force to study the effects of domestic
violence observing that "[a] child who grows up in a home where
one parent is beating the other is much more likely to grow up to
be either a batterer or a victim of family abuse.'
Sadly, it took
seventeen years before the New York State legislature took
affirmative action and it was not until May 21, 1996 that domestic
violence became a statutory factor to be considered under certain
circumstances when making a custody determination.16
Due to the heightened awareness of the effects of domestic
violence, and research proving that witnessing domestic violence is
harmful to children,17 DRL § 240 was amended stating,
12

Harriet Newman Cohen, 'Brainman' Still Vital After 24 Years: Courts Try to

Keep Warring Parents Involved When Joint Custody Not Possible, 7/15/2002

NYLJ 9, (Col. 1). The above list is not exclusive and may also include decisions
on
discipline, diet, summer camp, etc.
3
1 1d.
14 44

N.Y.2d 584, 589-590 (1978).

15 Wilk, supra note 6, at 294.
16 Id., see also Katherine M. Reihing, Protecting Victims of Domestic
Violence
and Their Children After Divorce: The American Law Institute's Model, 37
FAM. & CONCILIATION COURTS REv. 393, 394 (July 1999).
17 H.R. Rep. No. 101-737, at 3 (1990) (Congressional report addressing the issue

of child custody and domestic violence stating that children who witness abuse
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"where either party to an action concerning custody of or a
right to visitation with a child alleges in a sworn petition or
complaint or sworn answer, cross-petition, counterclaim or other
sworn responsive pleading that the other party has committed an
act of domestic violence.. .the court must consider the effect of
such domestic violence upon the best interest
of the child," when
8
evidence.1
the
of
preponderance
a
by
proven
While the factor of domestic violence was added to the statute, it is
still within the judge's discretion as to how much weight the factor
is given. 19
Today, over 40 states require domestic violence to be
considered when making child custody determinations. 20 Only in
New York are procedural and evidentiary standards necessary
before the factor can be considered. These evidentiary standards
can be extremely problematic if the standard is not met because the
judge can then dismiss the evidence in its entirety. Additionally,
the statute provides no guidance to judges' and he/she can choose
to believe or disbelieve the proof. Adopting a presumption would
solve many of the above problems.
"live in an atmosphere of emotional trauma, and are more prone to anxiety,
depression, learning disabilities, and delinquency problems").
IS N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (Consol. 2003); See also Lynne R. Kurtz,
Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the Creation of a Rebuttable
PresumptionAgainst Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child,60 ALB. L.
REv. 1345 (1997).
'9 In many cases the judge took the 1996 amendment seriously and gave the
factor substantial weight. E.g., In the Matter of E.R. v. G.S.R., 170 Misc. 2d 659
(Fam. Ct. Westchester Co. 1996) (the judge awarded sole custody to the mother,
in opposition to the recommendations of the law guardian and the expert,
because the father was abusive toward the mother); see also In Matter of J.D. v.
N.D., 170 Misc. 2d 877 (Faro. Ct. Westchester Co. 1996) (the judge awarded
custody to the mother because the father was psychologically abusive); see also
In Matter of N. Children,NYLJ Nov 19, 1996 at 26, col. 6, (Fam. Ct. NY Co.)
& In Matter of Tammy Irwin v. Peter Schmidt, 236 A.D. 2d 401 (1997) (both
courts awarded custody to the mother because of the fathers repeated acts of
domestic violence).
20 Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations
of
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, 36 No. 4
JUDGES' J. 38, 40 (Fall 1997).
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New York case law provides further evidence of the need
for the presumption. In Houck v. Garraway,the court granted the
mother and father joint custody despite evidence of domestic
violence on the part of the father. 21 In Hugh L. v. Fhara L, the
court discusses for pages how the parties are unable to cooperate
and goes on to outline the details of husband's arrest after he
pulled her hair out and kicked her because she broke a dish.22 The
court states, "it is clear that joint custody cannot succeed because
the parties are incapable of working together" 23 yet a few
paragraphs later the court awards spheres of legal decision-making.
The court stated that, "each parent shall be responsible for the
ultimate decision in certain areas, but will be required to consult
with the other parent., 24 If the parties are required to consult on
the decisions all the problems of joint custody outlined above still
exist.
On the other hand, it may seem like the current law is
working because the numbers of reported cases are very limited;
however, this should be a signal of the deeper underlying
problems. First, many family law decisions are unreported,
especially if the parties were never married. This creates a false
sense of security that the law is working as it should. Secondly,
joint custody is often granted by agreement of the parties, therefore
the cases would not be reported. However, once the victim
realizes that the joint custody arrangement is impossible, she might
simply try to seek a stay away order of protection instead of a
modification and as such DRL § 240 would not apply. However, if
she did try to modify the prior order she would no longer be
subject to the standard outlined in the DRL § 240, because in order
to modify an existing custody order she would have to show a
substantial change in circumstances. It is important that these
problems are not overlooked.
Further, in 1990, the United States Congress unanimously
passed a resolution calling on states to modify their laws to include
2!

293 A.D. 2d 782 (2002).

22 6/1/2000 N.Y.L.J. 29, (Col, 6) (June 1, 2000).
23 Id.
24

Id.
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25
a presumption against granting custody to batterers.
Additionally, the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence
also recommends a rebuttable presumption against awarding an
abusive parent sole or joint custody. 26 These resolutions are clear
and the only conclusion left to draw is that New York has ignored
these recommendations despite all the current evidence. It is time
for New York to fall in line and measure up to not only the
recommendations provided, but also to other states around the
nation.

DANGERS OF JOINT CUSTODY IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Domestic violence is a real and growing problem in the
United States. This phenomenon cuts across all socio-economic
lines and knows not race, age or gender. Shockingly, in the United
States, a women is beaten every fifteen seconds. 27 Statistics
further show that danger levels increase significantly for women
post-separation. 28 By continuing to award joint custody in the face
of domestic violence, our courts are placing millions of Americans
in unnecessary danger. Many of the dangers are separate and
distinct from those faced in cases of domestic violence and
separation and domestic violence and visitation. Fortunately, New
York does not have a presumption for joint custody, but it is still
awarded in many inappropriate circumstances, namely where
domestic violence is present.
In order for joint custody to be a viable alternative, it is
necessary that a few basic criteria be in place. First, both parents
should be committed to making the joint custody arrangement
work and have a good understanding of their respective roles in the
joint custody plan.29 Secondly, parents must also be willing to
H. Con. Res. 172, 10 1st Cong. (1990).

25
26

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, MODEL CODE
DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, Sec. 401 (1994), available at

ON

http://www.ncjfcj .org/dept/fvd/publications/main.cfn?Action=PUBGET&Filen
ame=new_modelcode.pdf
27 Kurtz, supra note 18, at 1345.
28 Khachaturian, supra note 6, at 1757.
29
JAY FOLBERG, ed., JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 13 (1984).
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negotiate any differences that may arise, separating the
husband/wife roles from their parental roles. 30 When joint custody
is granted, parents still have to collaborate to raise their child,
therefore there also needs to be a reasonable level of
communication and cooperation as well as flexibility.31 Thirdly,
there is a need for equal power and control. Domestic violence
exists in a relationship because of power and control exerted by the
abuser. This dynamic negates the ability of the victim to voluntary
consent to joint custody and to willingly and safely collaborate as a
joint parent.
Admittedly, joint custody can work for parents who are
able to put their differences aside for the sake of the children, but
in situations where domestic violence exists there is this
underlying and overlooked power and control factor on the part of
the abuser. The abuser is not able to understand his role in the
joint custody plan because the focus is entirely on regaining
power. 32 His role as husband and parent is one in the same. As
such, by awarding joint custody to an abuser, the court is
condoning his behavior and arguably helping him maintain control
of his victim 33and providing him the opportunity to continue the
victimization.
Often times, parents who have joint custody have to
collaborate on decisions such as education, religion and medical
care. Let us first deal with education. Most of the time, the school
attended by the child will be dictated by place where the child
resides. 34 This leaves little room for negotiation. In situations of
domestic violence, joint custody allows the abuser to have access
to the child at school, as well as all school records. This alone
presents a number of problems. Firstly, having access to the
school records could very possibly disclose confidential
information, such as the address of the victim, phone number or
place of employment.
30
31

32

Id.
Id. at 14.

The above is a generalization, and while there are always exceptions, it is true

in most cases.

33 See generally Khachaturian, supra note 6, at 1770.
34

JAMES C. BLACK & DONALD J. CANTOR, CHILD CUSTODY 25 (1989).
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Secondly, most of the time joint custody decrees allow the
abuser to pick the children up from school at any given time. This
allows the abuser to continue to threaten to take the children if
certain conditions are not met, and in fact do so upon his
dissatisfaction. For example, over the summer I met with a client,
with a history of physical, emotional and sexual abuse, who had
joint custody. Each day, the father would pick the child up from
day care and refuse to return the child home until the mother
agreed to have sexual intercourse with him. Fearing that she
would not be able to see her daughter she conceded to his demands
for nearly a week. She came to family court to get the order
modified and to obtain an order of protection, but the sad reality is
that I never once saw a custody order temporarily modified,
therefore she was forced to endure the situation until the
proceedings were over, which could very easily take months. In
another situation involving a history of domestic violence and an
award of joint custody, a father picked his two young children up
from school and refused to take them home. The mother contacted
the police who refused to go get the children because of the joint
custody order.
Evident by the above examples, the abuser used the award
of joint custody to continually manipulate and harass his victim by
using the children as pawns and as a means of access. Even in
situations where the victim has sole custody, the abuser will still
have access to the children via a visitation schedule. However, the
difference with sole custody is that the victim can provide a copy
of the order to the school and expressly prohibit the abuser from
picking up the children. Joint custody places the parents on equal
footing.
Joint custody and medical care also presents a number of
unique problems. Again, as with school records, access to medical
records could potentially disclose confidential information. In
reality, absent major operations or complications, there is little to
negotiate. Many times the child will already have a pediatrician,
one he has been going to his entire life. Granting access to the
records enables the abuser to become aware of appointment dates
and times. In most circumstances, a parent should have every right
to know when his child is sick, but again abusers are more often
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concerned with the quest for continued control. He can go to the
appointments and cause a scene for the child and the mother.
Perhaps a greater danger of the medical access, and again a
situation I witnessed during my clinic placement, is the ability to
make and cancel appointments for the child. An abuser can make
appointments for the child and quite possibly the mother will never
know about them. The abuser tries to use this apparent "neglect"
against the mother in his future petition for sole custody.
However, the ability to cancel the appointments is probably a more
powerful means of control. If the abuser cancels the appointment a
number of issues arise. First, most likely the child will not get
seen by the doctor, confirming the notion that his interests are
above that of the child. Second, by canceling the doctor's
appointment, the abuser may be again controlling the economic
viability of the victim. If she does not get fired for taking too
many days off, she may not be getting paid for the additional days
she had to take off for the second, or third or even fourth
appointment.
Even more problems may arise if the two parents do not
agree on the medical diagnosis and only one parent is
administering medication to the child. Extreme health conditions
for the child could arise if she is only receiving medication while
in the care of one parent and not the other. Similarly, problems
may occur if parents do not agree on methods of treatment and are
administering two different forms of medication to the child.
These drugs could quite possibly interact negatively within the
child's system causing additional health problems.
Finally, allowing the abuser medical access gives him the
opportunity to distort and twist the medical history of the child.
He can blame scars, broken bones or other conditions on the
mother making her appear neglectful. The abuser could also make
up reasons for injuries. For example, if a child fell down and
sustained a bump on his head the abuser is able to take the child to
the doctor. He can then tell the doctor anything he chooses about
the cause of said injury including that the mother struck the child.
The child may not be old enough to clearly articulate what really
transpired. Since the doctor is a mandated reporter, by law, he will
be forced to report the alleged incident to Child Protective Services
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(CPS). The abuser may then try to use these self-created
allegations and CPS investigation in any subsequent child custody
disputes. None of these problems would arise if a joint custody
order were not in place. An order granting sole custody to the
victim would allow that individual to prohibit the abuser from
taking the child to the doctor without permission, making
appointments, canceling appointments, and examining medical
records simply by communicating these wishes with the doctor's
office. All of the mechanisms used by the abuser are his way of
maintaining control and creating continued abuse and safety
concerns for the victim.
Another problem that arises because of joint custody
agreements is the potential endless court disputes over issues
regarding the child. In Trapp v. Trapp, the father litigated virtually
every child-rearing issue because he was unwilling to
compromise, 35 a loss of control in the eyes of an abuser. While the
court eventually eliminated the joint custody arrangement, it is
important to note that it took nearly a year. Again, endless court
disputes such as this create a tremendous financial strain on the
victim. Often times she is forced to quit her job, and if she is
fortunate enough, she will be given an assigned attorney, but this
still does not take into account the cost of child care while she
spends an exorbitant number of hours in court. 3 6 This could also
lead to a number of potential dangers for the child. For example,
the father could refuse to allow his child to get an operation. It is
quite possible that the child could be severely harmed in the
interim.
Joint custody clearly perpetuates the cycle of violence, the
same cycle the woman was trying to escape from and the same
cycle she tried to protect her children from. Studies of joint
custody have shown that children have more behavioral and social
37
problems when there is conflict and chaos between their parents.
35
36

136 A.D.2d 178 (1988).
Erie County Family Court has attempted to combat this problem by providing

free, secure day care facilities in the building.
Judith S. Wallerstein & Janet R. Johnston, Children of Divorce: Recent
Findings Regarding Long-Term Effects and Recent Studies of Joint and Sole
37
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By allowing joint custody to be granted where domestic violence
exists, the courts are systematically neglecting the children,
directly counter to their commitment to do what is in the child's
best interest. All of these dangers are distinct from those faced in
situations where the abuser only has visitation.
Finally, as clearly seen above, joint custody makes a
mockery of the system because it allows access and power to the
batterer to further threaten and control the victim. This is the same
system that has ignored the impact of domestic violence, despite
clear evidence of its effects and the same system that promised to
serve the "best interests" of the child.38 Now, because of the
system, the abuser is able to use the children as tools to serve his
best interests. 39 The New York approach should be modified to
reflect the above dangers.
LOUISIANA APPROACH

Louisiana has one of the most specific presumptions
against awarding joint custody to an individual with a history of
domestic violence.
The legislature further finds that the problems of
family violence do not necessarily cease when the
victimized family is legally separated or divorced.
In fact, the violence often escalates, and child
custody and visitation becomes the new forum for
the continuation of the abuse. Because current laws
relative to child custody and visitation are based on
an assumption that even divorcing parents are in
relatively equal positions of power, and that such
parents act in the children's best interest, these laws
often work against the protection of the children and
in families with a history of
the abused spouse
40
family violence.
Custody,. 11 PEDIATRICS REv. 197, 200 (1990); see also Handschu & Kisthardt,
supra note 10.
38 Khachaturian, supra note 6, at 1770.
39 Id.
40 LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 9:361 (2003).
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Using the above, Louisiana created a presumption that "no parent
who has a history of perpetuating family violence shall be awarded
sole or joint custody of the child.' 1 This presumption can be
overcome by a preponderance of the evidence, but the law insists
that the abuser prove he has successfully completed a treatment
program, is not abusing drugs and alcohol and that it is in the
child's best interest. 42 Further, if a parent is found to be a spousal
abuser, that parent is only allowed supervised visitations, by
statute, until a treatment program is completed.43 Thereafter the
abuser may have unsupervised visitation if he can prove to the
court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he44completed the
program and the other requirements outlined above.
This presumption in the Louisiana statute has been more
than just a law on the books. The courts have enforced this
presumption time and again. For example, in Hicks v. Hicks, the
Court of Appeal of Louisiana reversed the award of joint custody
because the trial court failed to apply the provisions of the
Louisiana Revised Statute § 9:364. 4s Ms. Hicks testified that Mr.
Hicks hit her in the stomach while she was pregnant, broke brooms
over her, forced her to have sex with him, hit her in the face and
threw her into a chair. 46 In reversing the trial courts decision, the
Court of Appeal repeated much of the language of Louisiana
Revised Statute § 9:364 and stated,
"as this statute is clear and
47
unambiguous, it is to be applied.9
Additionally, in Michelli v. Michelli, the Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's decision to award sole custody to the
mother because the husband was physically abusive to her and the
children.48 Testimony at trial indicated that Mr. Michelli hit his
wife in the face, called her derogatory names on a number of
41 LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 9:364 (2003).
42

id.

43 id

44id
45 733 So. 2d 1261, 98-1527 (La. App. 3 Cir. 05/19/99).
46
Id. at 1263.
41ld at 1265.
48 655 So. 2d 1342,

93 CA 2128 (La. App. 1 Cir, 05/05/95).
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occasions, slapped her, punched her, and shoved her repeatedly.49
Again the court simply reiterated the language of the statute.
Finally, in G.N.S. v. S.B.S., the Court of Appeal modified a joint
custody award and awarded sole custody to the father after it was
found that the mother, who has a history of family violence, was
physically abusing the child.50 Here again, the statute is so clear
that all the court did was cite sections outlined in Louisiana
Revised Statute § 9:364. 5 1 Additionally the court upheld the award
52
of costs imposed on defendant because of the family violence.
Louisiana Revised Statute § 9:364 provides in part, which the court
outlines, that "in any family violence case, all court costs, attorney
fees, evaluation fees, and expert witness fees incurred in
furtherance of this
Part shall be paid by the perpetrator of the
53
family violence."
These cases show the broad scope of the statute adopted by
the Louisiana legislature. It goes well beyond spousal abuse and
includes all family violence. The statute is clear enough that the
court has to do minimal, if any, statutory interpretation. With a
statute this specific it makes it very difficult for an abuser to
continue to control the victim during the custody dispute.
Furthermore, the court is obligated to inform the victim of this
presumption because it is codified.
NEW YORK CRITIQUE & RECOMMENDATIONS
New York does not have the benefits of a statute like the
one found in Louisiana. New York has embraced what many call a
"family systems" approach, "which views the family unit as
enduring following divorce, with both parents continually involved
with the children, almost no matter what." 54 The 1996 amendment
to the DRL § 240 was not enough and New York should create a
statutory presumption against awarding sole and joint custody to
49

1Id. at 1347.
50 796 So.2d 739, 35,348 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/28/01).
51
52

Id. at 753.

Id.

53 LA. REv. STAT. ANN
54

§ 9:367 (2003).
MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS 152 (1999).

Vol. XI

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

an abuser. As seen above, under the law as it currently stands,
domestic violence is only considered as a factor when it is raised in
a sworn petition, complaint or responsive pleading. 55 However,
this does not deal with any violence not reported in a sworn
petition.
Many argue that creating a presumption will increase the
number of false allegations in order to have leverage in the custody
disputes, 56 but this perceived problem can be overcome by
adopting a preponderance of the evidence standard, meaning that
domestic violence has to be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence. Additionally, the American Psychological Association
has stated, "false reporting of family violence occurs
infrequently." 57 Others argue that custody determinations are best
left to the courts, 58 but there is an inherent education problem with
that theory, meaning that in order to leave the decision up to the
courts, judges and lawyers have to be well educated about the
effects of domestic violence. Even if such education were to take
place, it still does not account for the individual subjectivity on the
part of the judge.
Ideally, statewide education should be
implemented simultaneously with the legislative presumption
against joint custody.
CONCLUSION

Joint custody... assumes an equity of power that is
lacking in families where violence is or has been
prevalent.
Meaningful separation is almost
impossible for a jointly parenting victim of abuse
given the requirement that parents participate
equally in decision-making.
Joint custody
essentially requires a battered parent to jeopardize

55N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (Consol. 2003).
56 Kurtz, supra note 18, at 1372.
57
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ASSOCIATION,

REPORT OF THE
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PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND
THE FAMILY 12 (1996).
58

Kurtz, supra note 18, at 1373.
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her safety by mandating frequent and potentially
59
conflict-laden interaction with the abusive parent.
It is certainly time that measures are taken to combat the inherent
problems and conflicts associated with domestic violence and joint
custody. Victims of domestic violence certainly have enough
problems to deal with in regards to visitation and post separation.
The courts should not continuously add to these problems by
granting joint custody with the abuser and, further, not informing
victims that joint custody cannot be awarded without their consent.
Only by adopting a presumption against the award of joint custody
can women be on their way to having former abusers, because joint
custody simply perpetuates the cycle.
In the interim, the awareness of the dangers of joint custody
and domestic violence needs to be made known to all those in the
legal arena but especially to advocates, attorneys' and judges'.
This can be accomplished though mandatory education. Moreover,
the courts should ensure that all victims have ample time to meet
with an educated advocate in order to have all their options
thoroughly explained to them. Additionally, the court should
inform the victim that it does not have the authority to grant joint
custody without the consent of both parties. These intermediate
efforts are absolutely necessary; however adopting a statutory
presumption would lessen the need for the victim to be entirely
informed because, by law, the judge would have to consider the
incidents of domestic violence and the dangers that accompany
such violence when joint custody is considered.

59 Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System

Should Do For Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 237,

255 (1999).
60 This by no means is suggesting that a victim should not be entirely
informed
whenever possible even if a presumption exists.

